But despite the efforts of Kant, Millund and their successors, many remain skeptical of the possibility of proving the objective truth or universal validity of moral claims. The fact that the moral objectists themselves cannot agree on the right moral system or what should be its philosophical basis fuels this skepticism. But it is also based on powerful philosophical considerations. Moral judgments, critics of objectivism say, have an element of irreversible assessment. They claim, assume or imply that a state is good or bad, that an action is good or bad, or that something is better than other things. But if you accept – as many do – that value judgments logically deviate from factual statements and cannot be inferred from them, any attempt to justify a moral requirement must at least be based on certain premises of value. And these fundamental moral conditions will not be justifiable at all. I like this comment to emphasize that moral rules are negotiated all the time, leading to the conclusion that moral disagreements are morally universal. Once we consider morality as a mechanism of coordination and social control, the content of moral norms must change to allow groups to adapt to changing environments. A sufficiently fine look at each moral system will show its own evolution in progress.
Experimental philosophy is an approach to philosophy that explicitly relies on experimental knowledge of science to address philosophical questions (see entry on experimental moral philosophy). There are three important possibilities in which experimental philosophy has played an important role in discussions of moral relativism. This is the extent to which there are differences of moral views or moral diversity among people (i.e. DMR), to what extent popular morality is attached to an objectivist or relativistic understanding of moral judgments (i.e. DMR) i.e. the views of ordinary people with respect to MMRs) and to what extent the acceptance of moral relativism influences moral attitudes such as tolerance (i.e. the opinions of ordinary people regarding MMRs) how views on MMRs causally influence whether or not people have tolerant attitudes). Another objection that is more direct to DMRs is that anthropologists have implicitly and mistakenly assumed that cultures are rather discrete, homogeneous and static beings – much like the forms of a Piet Mondrian painting or a chessboard. In fact, according to this statement, cultures are generally quite heterogeneous and complex internally, with many divergent voices.